Prosperity: The Conflict Trap

In The Bottom Billion, Paul Collier identifies four traps that have prevented the poorest nations from emerging to higher standards of living. The first trap is the conflict trap.

Conflict is common to all societies, but nations home to the bottom billion have an inordinate share of violent internal conflict. Collier estimates that seventy-three percent of the bottom billion have recently been through or are presently experiencing a civil war. Developed nations have had civil wars in the past, but unlike the poorest nations they have not remained trapped in an endless cycle of violent confrontations.

So what are the factors that tend to breed internal conflict? First, societies with stagnant low-income economies have a greater propensity for war. Collier suggests that if you halve the income of a given society, you double the chances for civil war. But one could ask about the direction of causality. Does poverty lead to civil war, or does civil war lead to poverty? The answer is that both are true, creating a cycle of destruction.

Second, these poorest societies have many alienated, uneducated young men with no dependents. This means there is an inordinately large supply of potential rebel recruits. The small chance of a big payoff for these men by participating in rebel actions is worth the risk. Collier says that research indicates that people with a sense of grievance are no more likely to engage in violence than those without one. It seems that rebel violence may be a symptom of insufficient societal restraints on violence rather than an inevitable expression of seeking justice.

Third, many poor nations are heavily dependent on commodity exports (ex., oil and minerals), and there is a correlation between this type of economy and civil unrest. With so much of the economy confined to a few concentrated enterprises, those who can control those enterprises profit greatly. International buyers of the commodities tend to back whoever is in control of the resources. If rebel forces render a better economic outcome, international players may fund and equip rebels.

These three causes help us understand the trap, but Collier gives greater nuance. For example, rebel movements may begin as noble challenges to oppression but tend to morph into something more sinister quickly. There is always a small percentage of any society that has a thirst for brutality and violence. As a rebel movement grows, it inevitably becomes a draw for these folks. Idealistic visionaries find holding the rank and file in line virtually impossible. Eventually, the social justice grievance becomes cover for a thirst for power and violence. Collier writes that "A flagrant grievance is to a rebel movement what an image is to a business." (25) The point isn't that governments who become the objects of rebellion are necessarily just and unworthy of protest. Instead, it is acknowledged that many of these civil conflicts quickly sink into unjust governments battling unjust and opportunistic rebels.

Collier notes that studies do not support the conclusion that ethnic diversity leads to proneness toward civil war. More correlated are nations with a majority ethnic group but one or more significantly large minority groups. Most of the poorest nations do not match this criterion, although notable exceptions of poor nations like Rwanda and Burundi are examples of this dynamic.

Another observation is that countries with populations dispersed around the edges of their territory or with mountainous terrain seem more at risk than densely populated flatland nations. Collier speculates this is because it gives rebel forces more places to form and hide.

The conflict trap is particularly devastating. While most international conflicts last six months on average, civil wars tend to last five years. Then when the war is over, a wave of homicide usually ensues. These wars usually generate significant numbers of refugees. As these weakened and malnourished folks travel about, they pick up diseases and spread them wherever they go. Collier points out that as much as half of the societal cost of civil war accrues after the war.

Sub-Saharan Africa has a high concentration of nations caught in the conflict trap. However, Collier notes, "Africa does not have more coups because it is Africa; it has more coups because it is poor." (36) Furthermore, he notes that attempts to establish democratic rights seemingly have little impact on reducing a nation's risk of coups and civil war. At the end of his discussion on the conflict trap, he writes, "I do not want to claim that only economy matters, but without [economic] growth, peace is considerably more difficult." (37)

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Comments

[Eric Judge]

Hi,
This is my first comment here though I have been following the site for some time. Thanks for providing sound reasons for helping me to realize that economic issues in the world are more multifaceted then they are usually explained by the pundits.
About this post, it reminds me of Jared Diamond's book collapse. He looks at the case of Rwanda and notes that it is was a very successful country in many ways, just over populated with many young men who didn't have any land or chance of land. So the issue there wasn't so much poverty but lack of enough land to go with a robust population.
I am not sure if the pop. was fueled by the type of prosperity that you are speaking of or not.
Also the ethnic issues of Rwanda were largely a consequence of colonialization and not a given feature of the nation prior to this time period (or so I have heard). I would be interested if in this book the author addresses the history of exploitation and colonialization of sub-sahara africa and factors that into his evaluation of poverty.
Truly thanks for the post, and for the blog.
You're a needed voice in my thoughts.

eric

[Michael W. Kruse]

Thanks for your kind comments, Eric.

There is no question that colonialism was dark development in Western history. However, it is not the case that most colonized cultures were in some pristine state of prosperity and then colonialism subjected them to poverty. More typically, the colonial powers suppressed development.

While we can look historically at the tragedy of colonialism, we are now thirty, forty, even fifty years beyond when most nations were colonized. The performance of once colonized nations is all over the map. Therefore, I don't think the performance of the poorest nations can generically be ascribed to colonialism.